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A SURVEY OF THE PROPOSALS TO LIMIT OR
DENY THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES-II
MAURICE S. CULP*

PART III.
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE MORE POPULAR CONTROL.

The Democrats were not at all pleased with the Federalists in
the Supreme Court at the beginning of the 19th century.

And

on January 13, 1802 on motion to repeal the judiciary act Senator Breckenridge said that the power of the Court to annul the
laws of Congress could not exist if the Constitution is to be a
practical system. He maintained that it was competent for the
department to which a certain power is given to construe that
power. He said:
"That it is, in fact more competent to that department to which powers
are exclurively confided, to decide upon the proper exercise of those powers
than any other department, to which such powers are not instructed, and
who are not consequently under such high and responsible obligations for
their constitutional exercise; and that, therefore, the legislature would have
an equal right to annul the decisions of the Court, founded on their construction of the Constitution as the Court would have to annul the acts of
49
the legislature founded on their construction."

In-the same year, Mr. Thomson remarked:
"As long as the office exists the judge holds it during good behavior; he
is, then, independent. Being independent, and not having that degree of
responsibility attached to his office which is attached to the legislative or
to the executive, the powers granted by the Constitution are to be strictly
construed: nothing to belief or to implication; nothing to construction; the
letter is to determine the extent of the powers, and I conceive it never was
intended they should transcend it."5o

The feeling between the Democrats and Federalists ran high
during Jefferson's administration. Justice Chase of the United
* See p. 492 for biographical note.
Elliott, Debates, vol. 4, 444.
5
o Annals of Congress, 7th cong., 1 sess., 552-554.

49

474
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States Supreme Court had made some remarks about the Jeffersonian party principles during the course of a charge to a
grand jury, and he was impeached by the House of Representatives for indiscretion on the bench. The Senate, however, failed
to convict. 51 Thus the effort to secure direct removal failed, but
the Republicans were not to be stayed in their attempt to curb
the "Federalist" Supreme Court. In 1805, after the acquittal
of Chase, Representative Randolph sought another method. He
introduced the following joint resolution for a constitutional
amendment:
"The judges of the Supreme Court and all other courts of the United
States, shall be removed by the President, on joint address of both houses
the Constitution of the
of Congress, requesting the same, anything in
52
United States to the contrary notwithstanding."

The proposal was obviously aimed at a control of the Court
and the judiciary in general through the threat of removal by
Congress.
And in the following year, 1806, another joint resolution of
a similar character was brought forth. The purpose of this
proposed amendment was to make the judges more amenable to
control. The remarks of one Mr. Smilie will serve to show the
spirit behind such proposals. Mr. Smilie observed :5
"For my part, I am so sensible that that part of the Constitution which

relates to the power of impeachment is a nullity

.

.

.

The resolution

before you goes to place the judges of the United States on the same independent footing with those of Great Britain. Whether our situation requires that they should stand upon higher ground is a proper subject for
discussion. I am rather inclined to think they are not."

Again on January 29, 1811 Representative Wright introduced
a joint resolution to amend the Constitution which reads as
follows :5'
"Resolved, That the judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts,
may be removed from office on the joint address of the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States."
51 Corwin, E. S., "Establishment of Judicial Review," 9 Michigan Law
Review, 293-94 (Feb., 1911).
52 Annals of Congress, 8th cong., 2 sess., 121.
53
Annals of Congress, 9th cong., 1 sess., 446.
54 11th cong., 3 sess., 836-838.
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He justified his resolution thus 55
"There are a variety of cases where the exercise of this power may be

necessary for the safety of the people, which ought to be the Supreme law.
This power, I trust, will never be abused by the American Congress."

The House refused to consider it.
In 1812 there was a similar proposal made in the House. 56
And four years later, Senator Sanford introduced a joint resolution which would have provided for a similar method of removal,
although the constitutional majority in Congress to effect removal would have been larger. The measure which follows was
read and passed to a second reading: 57
"The judges of all the courts of the United States shall be subject to
removal from office, by the President and both houses of Congress, when,
in their opinion, the public good will be promoted by removal; but, in such
cases, two-thirds of both houses shall concur with the President in the removal."
The feeling was current among the members of the 17th Congress, in 1822, that the Supreme Court and the judiciary in
general were exercising too much power, and efforts were again
made to make the Supreme Court more amenable to the popular
will. One proposal was to amend the Constitution so as to remove the judges on the address of both houses of Congress. 5s
Still another idea was evolved by Representative Lecompte, in
1831, when he moved that the committee on judiciary of the
House be instructed to inquire into the expediency of amending the Constitution so that the judges of all federal courts, including the Supreme Court, hold office for a term of years. 59
The House refused to consider the motion. In the following year
it again voted down his resolution. 0o Kentucky was one of the
western states whose statutes were nullified most by the Supreme
Court, and her congressmen were extremely active in attempts
to curb the power of that Court. Kentucky's sister state, Ohio,
was represented by men who were of the same mind. Mr.
55 Ibid.
56 12th cong., 1 sess., 1317.
57 14th cong., 1 sess., 170-171.

58 17th cong., 1 sess., 113-114.
59 21st cong., 2 sess., 340.
60 22nd cong., 1 sess., 1956.
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in his effort to secure
Homer, following Lecompte, was defeated
61
character.
same
the
of
something
Then the scene shifted to the Senate where Senator Tappan,
of Ohio, tried to secure a joint resolution for a constitutional
amendment to limit the terms of office of the judges of the Supreme and inferior courts. In 1840, 1842 and in 1844 the Senator introduced resolutions to that effect. 2 The purpose of all
these resolutions was to limit the term of office of the judges to
seven years, so long as they behaved themselves well. Mr. Tappan was satisfied with the judges so long as they were in the
vigor of life, but he felt that there had been too many instances
where judges have been unfit to discharge their duties. And
it would add greatly to our security in the 'enjoyment of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,' and strengthen our government much more, to have the exercise of all power more
immediately by the people in the election of all officers (judicial
as well as legislative and executive) for short periods of time,
and by direct vote of the people. He thought that the judges
became indifferent and had no incentive to work well, for their
tenure was for life, that they were not secure from personal or
private influence, and that they were none the less subject to political influence. The judiciary, after the election of Mr. Jefferson, "ceased to be representative or servant of the people in our
courts; but it was the fruitful representative of exploded principles and absolute maxims in government." The consequences of
the conservative judiciary working against a liberal executive
and legislative body was the interpretation of the Constitution
in a way to strengthen and consolidate federal power, whereas a
great majority of the people were in favor of a strict construction of the Constitution, and preserving the state government
every power not expressly delegated to the general government.
He quoted Jefferson :63
"The judicial power is the subtle corps of sappers and miners, constantly working underground to undermine the foundation of our confed. Let the future appointment of judges be for four or
erate fabric .
sLx years, removable by the President and Senate. This will bring their
conduct, at regular periods, under the revision and probation, and may
keep them in equipoise between the general and special governments."
61 23rd cong., 2 sess., 942-943.
62 26th cong., 1 sess., 514; 27 cong., 3 sess., 41; 28 cong., 1 sess., 304.
63 27th cong., 3 sess., app., 147-149.
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In 1847 Mr. Breese of Illinois introduced a resolution from
the Legislature of Illinois for amending the Constitution so as
to provide for a limited tenure for judges. 64 Then a proposal
for removal by joint address of a majority of both houses was
made by Underwood of Kentucky. 65 And in 1867 Williams of
Pennsylvania twice renewed a proposal for the removal of
judges by the President on the address of two-thirds of each
branch of Congress. 66
In 1868 Mr. Ashley introduced a resolution to amend the Constitution in order to provide that the judges of all courts hold
office for a twenty year period and to retire at the age of
seventy. 67 In a speech in support of his resolution he expressed
his fear of judicial usurpation and corruption. Referring to the
history of judicial usurpation the United States as running over
years of judicial "sapping and mining," he characterized the
Supreme Court as a thief of jurisdiction, and denounced it for
such "destructive" decisions as that in the Dred Scott case.
Following this there were various bills and joint resolutions,
introduced in Congress to limit the terms of federal judges. In
the 53rd Congress Representative Oats introduced a joint resolution to amend section 1 of Article Three as follows :6
"The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, appointed after
the ratification of this amendment shall hold their offices for a term of
ten years .
'
The Committee on the Judiciary reported favorably to the
resolution; the majority report stated that the change would
get rid of the incompetent judges and those whose judgments
were prejudicial and biased, and those who were partial toward
the interests and corporations, and lastly "that the federal judiciary with their life tenure, as Jefferson predicted about the
beginning of the present century, have proven to be a corps of
sappers and miners to undermine, distort, and partially destroy
all the checks and balances of the Constitution and to convert
our government into a centralism."
This report protested
against the support given by the Court to legislation through
64 29th cong., 2 sess., 435.
65 30th cong., 2 sess., -; Ames, Constitutiona Amendments, 151.
66 39th cong., 2 sess., 1313; Ames, Ibid., 151 (1849-50).
67

68

40th cong., 3 sess., appendix, 210.
53rd cong., 2 sess., House Rpt. No. 466 (1893-94).
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the taxing, coinage and commerce power, and inveighed against
the prostitution and destruction of the states. The resolution
was voted down.
Again in 1898 Senator Butler introduced a resolution for an
amendment providing that all federal judges should be chosen
by the electors qualified to vote for the lower house of Congress.
The judges of the circuit and district courts were to be elected
from their respective circuits or districts. The Supreme Court
was to be composed of from nine to thirteen judges, the country being divided into as many circuits as there were judges on
the Supreme bench, and a judge was to be elected from each
circuit. In addition the Chief Justice was to be elected by the
qualified voters of all the states.6 9 Proposals of a similar na70
ture were made in the next Congress.
In the election campaign of 1908 two parties which put national tickets in the field, the Socialist 7 ' and Independence parties, 72 declared for the popular election of United States judges
throughout.
About 1911 there was considerable agitation in the country
over the judicial recall, Mr. Roosevelt's name being among those
advocating a form of recall of state judges. In that year Senator Owen of Oklahoma introduced a bill for the election and
recall of federal judges. The bill read as follows :73
"Be it enacted, That any justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States and any judge of the circuit or district courts, or of any other court
of the United States is subject to recall by a resolution of the Congress of
the United States; that upon the passage of a resolution requesting the
President of the United States to nominate a successor to such justice, the
term of office of any such justice shall be terminated."

The circuit and district judges were to be elected for four
year terms. His reasons for making such a drastic proposal
are: (1) the federal courts have unlawfully assumed the right
to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional; (2) they have undertaken to invade the legislative function of Congress by judicial legislation; (3) they have overridden the rights of states
69 55th cong., 2 sess., 431.

56th cong., 1 sess., S. J.Res. 47; H. J.Res. 79 (1900).
Kirk Porter, National Party Platforms 317.
72 Ibid., 293.
73 62nd cong., 1 sess., S. B. 3112. It is not known how such a process
could be constitutional.
70

71
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by holding their laws unconstitutional, either on the charge that
such state laws were unconstitutional or that they were invalid on grounds of policy; (4) the courts have become tyrannical in the case of contempt and injunction suits; and (5) the
judiciary is not responsible to the people, either by election or
recall. He was of the opinion that the mere enactment of the
recall would have such a salutary effect that there would never
be any need of its exercise.7 4
The following session Representative Lafferty introduced a
joint resolution proposing an amendment to make the federal
judiciary elective and subject to recall.1 5 He tried again in the
next session.7 6 And in the four succeeding Congresses pro7
posals were made to elect the federal judges1
In 1920 Senator La Follette proposed an amendment to the
Constitution making all judges, of Supreme and inferior courts
as well, elective for a term of ten years, during which they were
to hold office only on pain of good behavior.78
In 1923 Representative Frear, in order to bring the Court
"close to the will of the people," proposed an amendment which,
with the requirement of unanimity in decisions, would have
placed the recall of the judges of the Supreme Court in the hands
of two-thirds of Congress7 9 And finally, in 1924, Mr. Dell
introduced a resolution for a constitutional amendment which
would have made inferior federal judges elective and the Supreme Court judges appointive from the ranks of the inferior
court judges, with the discretion in Congress to change the mode
of selection and term of office at any time.80
PART IV.
ATTEMPTS AT THE DENIAL OF JuDICIAL REvIEw.

In the discussions which grew out of the passage of the Alien
and Sedition Acts the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions inveighed against the idea of a "National Sovereignty with a final
74 62nd cong., I sess., 3359.
75

62nd cong., 2 sess., H. 3. Res. 227.

76 62nd cong., 3 sess., H. 3. Res. 371.
77 See 63rd cong., sp. sess.; 64th cong., 1 sess.; 65th cong., 2 sess.; 66th
cong., 1 sess.

66th cong., 2 sess., 4567.
79 67th cong., 4 sess., H. J. Res. 436.
80 68th cong., 1 sess., 3874.
78
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interpreting organ in the central government." They clearly
show that any final arbiter which was a branch of the central
government was reprehensible to a considerable body of the
American people. The Supreme Court was an object of attack
in these discussions, for the answers to the "Resolutions" by
the loyal states placed the interpreting power over matters of
national import in the Supreme Court.
The Kentucky Resolutions read in part as follows :81
"That the government created by this compact -was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since
that would have made its discretion and not the Constitution the measure
of its powers; but that, as in parties having no common judge, each party
has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of mode and
measure of redress."

The Virginia Legislature adopted resolutions, if less radical,
2
just as firm:
"That the acts (Alien and Sedition) aforesaid are unconstitutional and
that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each (state) for
co-operating with this State in maintaining unimpaired the authorities,
rights, and liberties reserved to the states respectively or to the people."

These resolutions were not drawn against any decision of
the Supreme Court, but they were directed against the supremacy of the federal government and its chief interpreting organ,
the Supreme Court. However, it is apparent from the reception which was accorded to them that they were taken as attacking the power of the Supreme Court, for legislature after
legislature replied that to the "supreme judiciary" was committed "the authority of ultimately and conclusively" deciding upon
the constitutionality of legislative acts.8 3 This is shown by
Haines who says :4
"As the legislatures of the states, so soon after the establishment of
the government under the federal constitution came out so unanimously
and unequivocally in favor of the view that the Supreme Court of the
United States was vested with the full and ultimate authority to determine
the validity of legislative acts of Congress, it appears useless to claim that
the national court usurped authority."
81 Works of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 8, 459.
82 C. G. Haines, Conflict over Judicial Powers in the United States to

1870, 57.
83 Haines, op. cit., 57-58.

84 Ibid, 58.
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Proposals to deny the power of judicial review came early in
the history of Congress. As early as 1805 Mr. Breckenridge of
Kentucky proposed an amendment to the Constitution which
would have withdrawn from the purview of the Supreme Court
suits in which a state was a party in certain instances. 85 And
in 1806 Senator Maclay gave notice of a resolution of the
Pennsylvania legislature calling for a constitutional amendment
which would define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
follows :6
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to controversies between a state and the citizen of another state;
between citizens of the same state claiming land under grants of different
states; and between a state or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens,
or subjects."
Jefferson's bitter antagonism against the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Marshall in particular, was well known, and he
was very apprehensive of the "sapping and mining" of the federal system which the Supreme Court was doing. And "from
the day of Marshall's appointment to the end of Jefferson's life,
the sage of Monticello planned for the removal of the great
judge or the essential curbing of the powers of his court."87
Jefferson supported and applauded the acrid and vitriolic onslaughts of Judge Roane of Virginia on the Supreme Court,
and he could not have received except'with approval a proposed
amendment fashioned by Judge Roane in 1821 to curb the
power of the Court. His proposal read as follows :8
"That the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any case in which a state shall be a party, except in controversies
between two or more states, nor to any other controversies involving the
rights of a state and to which such state shall claim to become a party.

That no appeal shall be construed to lie in any court of the United States
from any decision rendered in the courts of a state."
The effect of this would have been to divest the Court of all
suits to which a state was a party, except between individual
states, and of all appeals from the tribunals of a state in federal
questions.
85 8th cong., 2 sess., 53 (February 8, 1805).

86 9th cong., 1 sess., 68 (January 22, 1806).
87 Dodd, Wm. E., "Chief Justice Marshall and Virginia," American

HistoricalReview, vol. 12, 776 (July, 1907).
88 Ibid, 786.
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In 1822 other attempts were made in Congress to relieve the
89
situation by limiting and defining the jurisdiction of the court.
In the following Congress Mr. Stephenson of Virginia introduced
a resolution for the repeal of the twenty-fifth section of the
judiciary act of 1789.90 He remarked that he knew very well
that the recent controversies which had arisen between the
federal and state governments, as to their rights and powers,
were of extreme "delicacy and importance." He thought that
the repeal of "article twenty-five", which allowed appeals from
state courts, in federal questions, to the Supreme Court, would
ease the situation.
The Supreme Court had been nullifying state statutes irrespective of adverse criticism. The twenty-fifth section of the
judiciary act, therefore, was the chief point of attack since it
was through that section that the Court secured jurisdiction over
such controversies. On April 10, 1826 Representative Holmes
offered a resolution to repeal the twenty-fifth section. He said :91
"I would do it on this ground: if the parties see fit to take their remedy
in a state court, and pursue that remedy to final adjudication in the highest
tribunal of a state, whatever that decision should be, I say the parties ought
to be bound."
When Congress convened in 1830, a fight was imminent over
the curbing of the Court's power. Warren says :92 "shortly after
Congress convened the House of Representatives instructed its
committee on judiciary to inquire into the expediency of a bill
repealing section twenty-five (judiciary article) in view of the
South Carolina and Georgia nullification." And Warren quotes
a New York Whig paper as follows: "The court has met, with
a knowledge that it will be violently assailed in the House of
Representatives, and that an attempt will be made to deprive
it of its constitutional right to decide on the constitutionality
of state laws." This fear was not altogether unfounded, for
the committee on judiciary, on February 9, 1831, reported a
that "the states are by this section deprived of the right of determining their own powers, and are made subordinate to the Supreme Court of the United States," and that there was a strong
80 17th cong., 1 sess., 113-114.
90 18th cong., 1 sess., 1682.

91 19th cong., 1 sess., 463.
92

Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 11, 198.

93

21st cong., 2 sess., 662.
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current of distinguished opinion to the
Court had no authority to declare the
stitutional, affirming that the duty rests
exclusively. These strong words were

effect that the Supreme
laws of a state unconwith the state tribunals
used:

"Can it be supposed by any rational man, that the framers of the Constitution ever contemplated an encroachment on the sovereignty of the
states, such as would reduce them to mere petty corporations, or to perpetuate inferiority, annihilating at once every vestige of their sovereignty
and independence."

The House failed to take action.
In 1858 "a renewed effort was made by the Abolitionist press
and in Congress to weaken the authority of the Court by a move
to repeal the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act and to
abolish the jurisdiction on writs of error to state courts," says
Warren. Bills to that effect, by Senator Pugh of Ohio, were
introduced in the first session of the thirty-fifth Congress, but
they were reported adversely.
Ten years later, in 1868, Congress passed a measure which
actually curtailed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with
the express purpose to prevent judicial review of Congressional
legislation. An act of April 5, 1867 had provided for appeals
from the United States Circuit Court to the Supreme Court in
Habeas Corpus proceedings. 94 Up to that time the Supreme
Court had had no appellate jurisdiction in such cases. But at
the time it seemed that such provision would be necessary for
the preservation of individual and personal liberty. Shortly afterward, November, 1867, one William McCardle, detained under
military custody, secured a writ of Habeas Corpus in the United
States Circuit Court of the district of Mississippi to his military custodians, and he was brought into the custody of the
United States marshall, being released on bail. An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court, and, despite contention of government counsel to the contrary, that court held that it had jurisdiction under the act of 1867, and the motion of government
counsel to dismiss was denied. 95
Congress thereupon, by attaching a repeal clause to a more
important measure, passed an act repealing so much of the act
of 1867 which allowed jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in
94
95

Habeas Corpus Act, April 5, 1867.
Wn. H. McCardle, 6 Wallace 318, 327.
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Habeas Corpus appeals, and interdicted those cases in which
appeals had already been commenced. President Johnson vetoed
the measure, but Congress passed it over his veto, in the face
of accusations to the effect that the bill was rushed through, appended to a necessary bill, in order to prevent the Supreme
Court from deciding the McCardle case, the reason being the
fear that the Supreme Court would declare the reconstruction
96
laws unconstitutional.
The Court did not come to a final decision of the case until
after the passage of the repeal clause. Then Chief Justice Chase,
for the Court, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction,
saying :97
"We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.
We can only examine into its powers under the Constitution, and the power
to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is given by
express words." The Court continued:9S "It is quite true, as was argued
by the counsel for petitioner, that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
is not derived from acts of Congress. It is strictly speaking conferred by
the Constitution. But it is conferred 'with such exceptions and under such
regulations as Congress shall make."'

It was insisted that the Court could proceed with the case
since the proceedings had been commenced before the passage
of the repeal acts, but the Court declared that the general rule
is that an act of Congress, when repealed, must be considered as
never having existed except as to transactions passed and closed.
According to the rule, therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction
over the appeal. 99 And to the contention that the court had
other appellate jurisdiction than that named by Congress, the
Court said of Congress:100
"They have declared affirmatively its jurisdiction, and this affirmative
description has been understood to imply a negation of the exercise of such
appellate powers as is not comprehended within it."

This is the only instance where the power of the Court has
been effectively curtailed by the majority party in the furtherance of its own questionable policies. And if the decision of
96 40th cong., 2 sess., 2165-67.
97 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wallace 506 at 514.
98 Ibid., 513.
99 Ibid, 515.
100 Ibid, 513.
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the Court in the McCardle case is binding authority, there is no
reason why Congress might not at any time restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to prevent decisions adverse to congressional, or for that matter, state legislation.
In 1858, says Warren, a measure originating with Thaddeus
Steven in the House which expressly forbade the Supreme Court
to take jurisdiction in any case in law or equity arising out of
the reconstruction acts was introduced by Lyman Trumbull in
the Senate.' 0 ' But that body took no action.102
The same Illinois Senator in the next Congress reported a
bill "To define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in certain
cases,"' 0 3 but the measure in fact was designed to destroy the
Court's power of judicial review. At the same time Senator
Drake of Missouri' 0 4 delivered a violent speech advocating a
bill to provide that no court created by Congress should have
power to declare invalid any act of Congress, and to prevent the
Supreme Court, through its appellate jurisdiction, from affirming any such judgment of invalidity by an inferior court.
And Senator Sumner introduced a bill which purported to
prevent the Supreme Court from passing upon the validity of
acts of the legislature or executive. The bill, in part, provided:
"that the judicial power extends only to cases in law and equity arising
under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, and does not

include the President or Congress, being the other. departments of the government, or any of their acts, civil or political, in their official capacity,
under the requirements, sanctions, and responsibilities of the Constitution;
and all such acts are valid and conclusive on the matters to which they
apply . . ."1o5

In 1908 the Socialist Party Platform advocated the abolition
of the power of judicial review :10
"The abolition of the power usurped by the Supreme Court of the
United States to pass upon the constitutionality of the legislation enacted
by Congress. National laws to be repealed only by act of Congress or by a
referendum vote of the whole people."
10 40th cong., 2 sess., 21, 27.
102 Warren, op. cit., III, 193.

103 41st cong., 2 sess.,. 167.
104 Warren, op. cit., III, 214.

105 41st cong., 2 sess., 2895-96.
108 Porter, op. cit., 367.
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The party has been consistent in advocating the change ever
07
since.
In the Sixty-fourth Congress proposals were made both in the
House and Senate to put an end to the "constitutional powers"
of the Court. l0 8 Senator Owen, speaking in favor of his joint
resolution, declared that the Court had usurped the power to
declare measures unconstitutional, and that the early fathers
voted against any such plan. His proposal therefore was to
secure a constitutional amendment as follows :109
"That from and after the passage of this act federal judges are forbidden to declare any act of Congress unconstitutional. Any judge who
declares any act passed by the Congress of the United States to be unconstitutional is hereby declared to be guilty of judicial usurpation and guilty
of violating the Constitutional requirement of good behavior upon which
his tenure of office rests, and shall be held by such decision to have vacated
his office."

In the Sixty-fifth Congress a joint resolution and a bill were
introduced, both of which had as their object the limitation of
the right of the Supreme Court to declare acts unconstitutional. 110
And the proponents of the child labor law of 1918 sought to
prevent the possible review of that law by the Supreme Court,
which the Court did finally review and declare unconstitutional."' Senator Owen had a plan whereby this possibility could
be avoided.112 The following quotation will show his plan:
"This can be done under the Constitution in the manner -which I have
proposed by forbidding the judges of inferior federal courts to question the
constitutionality of an act when Congress has declared it constitutional,
and removing the appellate power from the Supreme Court to pass on this
constitutionality. In this way, there would be no conflict between the
Congress and the Supreme Court. There ought to be none. The bodies exercising the power of this great republic ought to act along lines of perfect
harmony, not along lines of conflict. The people ought to know what the
law is when Congress has spoken and not wait twenty years to have it declared unconstitutional by a changing Court."
See Porter, op. cit.
1os 64th cong., 2 sess.,
109 64th cong., 2 sess.,
110 65th cong., 2 sess.,
111 65th cong., 2 sess.,
112 This was previous
U. S. 251.
107

S. J. Res. 196; H. J. Res. 361.
1068.
H. J. Res. 39; H. R. 12415.
7433.
to the decision in Hammer 'v. Dagenhart, 247
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This would in effect take from the lower courts the power to
pass upon questions of constitutionality, and at the same time
prevent appeals to the Supreme Court on the constitutionality
of such legislation, The passage of the act would have been
presumptive evidence of its validity. And in the House Representative Landon of New York spoke against the recurrence of
such decisions as that in the Child Labor Case thereby stopping
the enactment of measures for the social and industrial welfare by national legislation. He said :113
"That every law should be accompanied by the statement that the Supreme Court shall have no power to declare it unconstitutional. Another
remedy proposed is that the Supreme Court, which has appellate jurisdiction, shall be deprived of the opportunity to have matters involving the constitutionality of federal statutes brought up before them on appeal."

Again in 1923 Senator Owen introduced a bill to limit the
Court's power of judicial review:114
"That from and after the passage of this act federal judges are for-

bidden to declare any act of Congress unconstitutional. No appeal shall be
permitted in any case in which the constitutionality of an act of Congress is
challenged, the passage by Congress of an act being deemed conclusive presumption of the constitutionality of such act."
An unofficial proposal was advocated- by Jackson Harvey
Ralston. He would by a constitutional amendment deprive the
Supreme Court of its power to declare void or refuse to enforce
any act of Congress whatever. 115
Summary.
Appeals from decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of
constitutional questions have been proposed to ad hoe and
permanent bodies and also to Congress as a whole. The preconstitution proposals, in the case of the recommendations of
Massachusetts and New York, provided for appeals to an ad hoe
commission to be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
In 1821 a proposal was made to provide an appeal to the
Senate in any case in which any state might be a party or desired to become a party by virtue of its constitution or laws be113 65th cong., 2 sess., 7692.

114 67th cong., 4 sess., 2416.
115 Forum, vol. 71, 567-70.

SURVEY OF PROPOSALS

ing questioned. A similar proposal was made in the same Congress. In 1826 it was again suggested that the Senate be given
appellate jurisdiction. All of these proposals were obviously
made to protect the states from the growing power of the Supreme Court.
In 1867 Davis of Kentucky proposed that all cases of a constitutional character under the national government and all questions of a conflict of jurisdiction between it and state governments should be decided by a permanent tribunal composed of
one member from each state, thereby divesting the Supreme
Court and the federal judiciary of all of this jurisdiction.
A different and more restricted proposal was made by Senator
La Follette in 1922. It was directed against the nullification
of acts of Congress and provided that Congress might reverse
adverse decisions of the Supreme Court by a repassage of such
measure. Proposals of a like nature were made later, one of
them requiring a two-thirds vote of Congress to overrule the
decision.
The proposals to require an extraordinary number of judges
to concur in holding laws unconstitutional fall into three
classes: In regard to state laws alone, both state and national
laws and national laws alone.
The first proposal of this character came in 1823 when it was
proposed that seven judges, all of the then existing court, concur in decisions adverse to state and congressional legislation.
The next year Senator Van Buren sponsored a proposal that
five of the seven judges of the Supreme Court concur in decisions adverse to state laws. And a measure was advocated that
would have required a majority of a quorum of the Court to be
also a majority of the Court. Another proposal was to the effect
that no state law should be held unconstitutional without the
concurrence of two-thirds of the judges of the Court.
In 1826 there was a bill before Congress to increase the membership of the Court to ten, and to this an amendment was offered which provided that seven of the ten judges should concur in decisions holding both national and state laws invalid.
Another amendment provided for the concurrence of six of the
ten justices.
In the Reconstruction days Congress, in order to prevent
radical legislation from being invalidated by the Court, received
a proposal to require two-thirds of the justices to concur in
decisions holding congressional legislation unconstitutional. In
1868 a bill was introduced which provided that the concurrence
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of all of the justices be required in holding both state and Congressional legislation unconstitutional.
In 1896 a proposal of the above character was made in regard
to Congressional legislation alone. Then in recent years various
men have proposed that seven justices or a number equalling
two-thirds of the membership of the Court concur in holding
acts of Congress unconstitutional.
The movement to control the Court and make its decisions
more amenable to the popular will has been also in the direction
of congressional recall and popular election. The first attempt
of this nature came in 1805 when it was proposed that the judges
of all federal courts be made removable by the President upon
joint address of both houses of Congress. These proposals were
made repeatedly for more than a quarter of a century afterward.
The majority required in Congress to procure removal varied,
but the central idea prevailed throughout. As early as 1822 a
proposal was made to elect the federal judiciary. A series of
like measures were brought forward in the 1840's and during
the Reconstruction period. Efforts have been made ever since to
secure popular election and congressional recall. In 1908 the
Socialist and Independence parties advocated popular election.
Senator La Follette was also a staunch advocate of popular
election.
The proposals to deny the power of judicial review to the
Court have had as their object protection of state laws, congressional legislation and both. The tone of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions was distinctly adverse to the power, and proposals were soon made in Congress to prevent its application
to certain cases involving the rights of states. Another mode of
attack was the attempt to prevent appeals from state court to
the Supreme Court of the United States. This called for the
repeal of Article 25 of the judiciary act. Then there is the
actual possibility that Congress will take away some of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction and thereby curtail its
power as was actually done in the McCardle Case.
The Reconstruction period also saw efforts to deny the Court
power to pass upon the constitutionality of the Reconstruction
Acts and to even practically do away with that function of the
Court. The Socialist Party in 1908, and ever since, has advocated the denial of the power of the Supreme Court to declare laws
unconstitutional. With them agrees Senator Owen who has
proposed that federal judges be denied that power and be subject to removal if they attempt to exercise it.
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